The United States: World Position on the Line
One consequence of the war in Iraq will be authorization for a larger standing Army for the United States. In the process of authorizing and creating the increase in Army strength, the Guard and Reserve will be examined, pruned, and re-tasked. Homeland security will exert greater influence. In the debate on these changes, a draft will certainly come in for discussion. The draft is not likely to be reinstituted in the United States, but the discussion will include views on how to democratize and diversify U.S. armed forces. Think of these social objectives as aspects of military transformation that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld likely did not consider when he gave the term its first meaning during his tenure. The new soldier will have to be enlisted knowing that the terms of engagement have themselves been transformed on initiatives the U.S. military did not anticipate, not all by terrorists but some from the U.S. Congress as well.
The timing for the coming debate on force strength awaits resolution of citizen wills that change with time, wills that no one has (as of 12/02/2005) measured. Though there are many potential hostile situations around the world, not secret and certainly covered in the press, the war in Iraq will have an outsized influence on future U.S. military strength, and possibly on U.S. world position.
The “beat” on Iraq is coupled ever more closely to the calendar, with the metronome amplified. A time certain has not yet been defined. The number of months before the will of the citizens of the United States is determined by poll or change of U.S. government to have been broken on ‘staying the course’ in Iraq can still change, though the number is presently decreasing. Rep. Murtha’s six months to begin a drawdown may well define the day. It certainly commands the issue. The third democratic Iraq election in December 2005 could lengthen or shorten citizen, military or political views on the time to begin a drawdown. There is no base date for drawdown but a base date discussion is in progress. The period it will take for U.S. will to yield could still be influenced by revelation of an as yet unpublished number of months that the U.S. military command persuasively presents will be necessary before a drawdown can commence. Whatever it takes to define “will,” an open democracy is forced to play its hand with its cards exposed. U.S. citizen and U.S. military resolves will be influenced, possibly in different ways, by the insurgent’s ability to extract a death toll in civilian and military casualties and their ability to make world political capital from those casualties.
Terrorists do not feel the media pressures or political pressures that the U.S. administration, its Congress, and its military command feel. The Congress, as representatives of the people, did not demand a withdrawal time line when the war began. The Congress increasingly wants the administration and the military establishment to define a time line. Irrespective of the situation in Iraq, it is sobering to reflect that the Congress can declare “success” if it passes a withdrawal date resolution and the administration meets it and “failure” if the administration does not meet a withdrawal date resolution passed by the Congress. Any failure would not be characterized in the short term as a military failure, but as an administration failure. “Success,” in this context, could prove to be the ultimate failure.
The strength authorizations for U.S. armed services represent the best that Congress and the Executive can do in the real world, though some political bulges may appear around the edges. Had the U.S. war machine gone into Iraq with decidedly larger foot soldier strength, no one can be sure that the situation militarily would be greatly different from current reality, except, I believe, in one important respect. The number of U.S. soldiers killed would have been greater. Large forces demand large supply lines. At their termini, those supply lines have been very vulnerable.
The increased size of the U.S. Army is forced by the expanding presence of jihadists who have as a principal weapon, martyrdom. Fighting now or fighting later? I believe the administration chose now, and I believe that it was the right choice. It was already late.
The timing for the coming debate on force strength awaits resolution of citizen wills that change with time, wills that no one has (as of 12/02/2005) measured. Though there are many potential hostile situations around the world, not secret and certainly covered in the press, the war in Iraq will have an outsized influence on future U.S. military strength, and possibly on U.S. world position.
The “beat” on Iraq is coupled ever more closely to the calendar, with the metronome amplified. A time certain has not yet been defined. The number of months before the will of the citizens of the United States is determined by poll or change of U.S. government to have been broken on ‘staying the course’ in Iraq can still change, though the number is presently decreasing. Rep. Murtha’s six months to begin a drawdown may well define the day. It certainly commands the issue. The third democratic Iraq election in December 2005 could lengthen or shorten citizen, military or political views on the time to begin a drawdown. There is no base date for drawdown but a base date discussion is in progress. The period it will take for U.S. will to yield could still be influenced by revelation of an as yet unpublished number of months that the U.S. military command persuasively presents will be necessary before a drawdown can commence. Whatever it takes to define “will,” an open democracy is forced to play its hand with its cards exposed. U.S. citizen and U.S. military resolves will be influenced, possibly in different ways, by the insurgent’s ability to extract a death toll in civilian and military casualties and their ability to make world political capital from those casualties.
Terrorists do not feel the media pressures or political pressures that the U.S. administration, its Congress, and its military command feel. The Congress, as representatives of the people, did not demand a withdrawal time line when the war began. The Congress increasingly wants the administration and the military establishment to define a time line. Irrespective of the situation in Iraq, it is sobering to reflect that the Congress can declare “success” if it passes a withdrawal date resolution and the administration meets it and “failure” if the administration does not meet a withdrawal date resolution passed by the Congress. Any failure would not be characterized in the short term as a military failure, but as an administration failure. “Success,” in this context, could prove to be the ultimate failure.
The strength authorizations for U.S. armed services represent the best that Congress and the Executive can do in the real world, though some political bulges may appear around the edges. Had the U.S. war machine gone into Iraq with decidedly larger foot soldier strength, no one can be sure that the situation militarily would be greatly different from current reality, except, I believe, in one important respect. The number of U.S. soldiers killed would have been greater. Large forces demand large supply lines. At their termini, those supply lines have been very vulnerable.
The increased size of the U.S. Army is forced by the expanding presence of jihadists who have as a principal weapon, martyrdom. Fighting now or fighting later? I believe the administration chose now, and I believe that it was the right choice. It was already late.
posted by Franklyn E. Dailey Jr. at 12:53 PM
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